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THE FINALITY OF A PLEA OF GUILTY
William H. Erickson
I. Introduction
Pleas of guilty are estimated to account for at least ninety per cent of the
criminal convictions every year.' Such dispositions are clearly necessary from a
pragmatic point of view. If a trial were required for every defendant, there
would not be enough judges, defense counsel, prosecutors, or courtrooms. Guilty
pleas, however, must reflect more than the defendant's desire for lenient treat-
ment and the prosecutor's concern for case load management. Justice, especially
criminal justice, must be founded on truth. The quest in a criminal trial is a
search for truth; therefore, guilt must be the truth. Fair and accurate guilty
pleas also hasten the beginning of rehabilitation and increase respect for our
criminal justice system. If trials serve to decide primarily those cases in which
the defendant has grounds for contesting guilt, the presumption of innocence and
the requirement for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will regain their
deserved vigor. Since rehabilitation cannot truly begin if the accused is still
struggling to avoid responsibility for his conduct, the finality of a guilty plea is
also an important feature of an effective system of criminal justice. Standards
developed in recent years by the American Bar Association assist judges, prosecu-
tors, and defense counsel alike in arriving at fairness and accuracy in entering
guilty pleas with a view to minimizing post-conviction contests as to finality.
Indeed, these standards relating to guilty pleas constitute a major step toward
increasing the overall effectiveness of the criminal process.'
II. History
The critical and peculiar nature of a plea of guilty has long been recognized.
"A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an
extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. More is not required, the court
has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence."' Since the plea operates as
a conviction, its validity must be as firmly grounded as any conviction. In
Machibroda v. United States,4 the petitioner, under the so-called federal habeas
corpus provision,' moved to set aside and vacate the sentence he was serving
* Justice, Colorado Supreme Court.
1 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967). In Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 '(1971), justice Douglas, in a footnote [1a] to his concurring opinion, recognized
that the percentage of convictions based on guilty pleas was 90.2 in 1964. In fiscal 1970,
28,178 convictions occurred in 89 United States District Courts, of which 24,111 were by
plea of guilty or nolo contendere. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
2 See generally, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1968) [hereinafter cited as PLEAS OF GUILTY].
3 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
4 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1971). District courts are required to grant a prompt hearing to
determine issues, make findings of fact and conclusions of law. This procedure is followed
unless the motions, files, and records of the case show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.
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because his plea of guilt was not voluntarily entered. In spite of the government's
contentions that the petitioner's allegations were improbable and unbelievable,
the Court ordered a hearing, largely because of the gravity of the petitioner's
claim.
Procedures to follow in accepting guilty pleas were lacking until the
Supreme Court of the United States, acting under its rule-making power, pro-
mulgated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 Subsequently,
the Court established the all but constitutional significance of Rule 11 in
McCarthy v. United States.' In McCarthy, the Court held that if the District
Court failed to comply with Rule 11, the defendant's plea of guilty must be set
aside and the case remanded for another hearing. Rule 11 is designed to elimi-
nate any need to resort to a subsequent fact-finding proceeding after a plea of
guilty is accepted." In a decision that clarified the prerequisites for acceptance
of a plea of guilty, the Court, in Boykin v. Alabama,9 found reversible error
where the record failed to show that the defendant voluntarily and understand-
ingly entered his plea of guilty. In that case, the Court explained that a guilty
plea waived three important constitutional rights: the right to trial by jury, the
right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against compulsory self-in-
crimination. The essence of Boykin' ° was to make the requirements of Rule 11
applicable to the states.
Accuracy is paramount; force, threats, or lack of knowledge and under-
standing by the accused deprive a guilty plea of validity. Improper promises
or misrepresentations by the prosecution or gross error by defense counsel will
destroy the seeming insulation of a guilty plea which is entered in literal ao-
cordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. A recent
series of Supreme Court cases deal with post-conviction attacks on the voluntari-
ness of guilty pleas." These cases hold that a defendant assumes the risk of error
in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law or the facts when he enters
a plea of guilty. The guilty plea of a defendant represented by competent counsel
in Brady v. United States'2 was not made involuntary solely because the plea was
prompted by the defendant's fear of the death penalty possibility if the case were
to be tried by a jury.
6 FED. R. Cram. P. 11 provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of court, nolo con-
tendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such
plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally
and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judg-
ment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the
plea.
7 394 U.S. 459 (1969). It was a violation of FED. R. Cium. P. 11, that required the dis-
solution of the plea of guilty in this case. Numerous post-conviction attacks on the constitu-
tional validity of guilty pleas can be avoided by close adherence to the rule.
8 Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965).
9 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
10 Id.
11 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
12 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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In McMann v. Richardson,"3 the defendants were denied hearings on their
habeas corpus petitions. The fact that their pleas of guilty were entered with the
advice of competent counsel superseded the defendants' allegations of improperly
procured confessions. In Parker v. North Carolina,'4 purported police mis-
conduct during interrogation did not vitiate a plea of guilty which was entered
freely and voluntarily more than a month after the interrogation. Indeed, where
there is a factual basis for the plea, North Carolina v. Alford" teaches that a
plea of guilty may be voluntary in spite of being combined with protestations of
innocence. In Dukes v. Warden" the Court held that where a plea of guilty was
fair and accurate, an attorney's representation of others in a related but separate
proceeding was not sufficient reason to vacate the plea. The foregoing cases make
it clear that the Supreme Court has recognized the finality of a plea of guilty
when proper safeguards have been afforded the defendant.
III. The Providency Hearing
A. Is the Plea of Guilty Fair and Accurate?
Most states have statutes or court rules relating to the acceptance of guilty
pleas that parallel Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." These
laws are by no means uniform and indicate no universal concern either for pro-
tecting the defendants from injustice or safeguarding the pleas from attack. The
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice [hereinafter referred to
as Standards] include Pleas of Guilty among seventeen criminal procedural
Standards. The seventeen Standards work together to provide guidance at each
stage of criminal proceedings. The Standards attempt to clarify existing pro-
cedures and to delineate new ones that will improve the truth-finding process in
13 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
14 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
15 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
16 Dukes v. Warden, Connecticut State Prison, 406 U.S. 250 (1972).
17 ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 277 (Cum. Supp. 1972); ALASKA R. CRrm. P. 11; Aasz. R. Caim.
P. 160, 189; 4A ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1221 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1017 (West 1970);
COLO. R. Caim. P. 11(a); 28 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-60 (1960); DELA. SUPER. CT.
(Cam.) R. 11; FLA. R. C~am. P. 3.170; 10B GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1404 (1972); HAWAn R.
Cam. P. 11; 4 IDAHo CODE ANN. § 19-1714'(1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-4 (1970);
IND. R. Ca.ms. P. 10; 56 IOWA CODE § 777.12 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210 (Cum.
Supp. 1970); Ky. R. Ca m. P. 8.08; 2 LA. STAT. ANN. art. 556 Code of Crim. P. (1967);
ME. R. Cam. P. 11, 11(A); 9B MD. ANN. CODE, MD. R. P. 720-722 (1971); MASS. R. CaIM.
P. 4, 5; 40 MiCH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 767.37 (Cum. Supp. 1972); 41 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
630.29-.30 (1947); 2A Miss. CODE ANN. § 2564.5 (Cum. Supp. 2A, 1971); Mo. R. CRIm. P.
25.04; 8 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-1606 (1969); NEB. Rv. STAT. § 29-1820 (1965);
5 NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 174.045,-.055,-.065 (1971); 5 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 605:3 (1955);
N. J. R. R. C~am. PRAc. 3: 5-2; 6 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-23-21 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1972);
11A N.Y. Cams. P. L. §§ 220.10-.30 (McKinney 1971); 5 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-14-16, -17
(1960); Onro REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2943.03-.04 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 22, § 516
(1969); 1 ORE. REv. STAT. § 135.840 (1971); PA. R. Calm. P. 319; 3 R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 12-12-19 (1970); 4 S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-511, 17-512 (1962); 8 S.D. CODE §§ 23-35-18,
-19, -20, -21 (1969); 7 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2310 (Cum. Supp. 1972); TEx. CODE CamS.
PRoc. arts. 26.13, -. 14, 27.13 (1966); art. 27.14 (Cum. Supp. 1971); 8 UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-24-3, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10 (1953); 4 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.1-19.2 (1960); 10 WASH. IEV.
CODE ANN. § 10.40.170 (1961); 17 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-1(a) (1966); 42A Wis. STAT.
§ 971.08 (1971); Wyo. R. Ca m. P. 15.
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criminal cases. Particular attention is paid to the proceeding at which the de-
fendant tenders his plea of guilty-the so-called providency hearing. The con-
stitutional requirements for the providency hearing set forth in all the recent
Supreme Court decisions are rather similar to the framework established in the
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty.
A Presidential Commission has outlined the judge's obligation and difficult
function which he must carry out at the providency hearing.' The judge must
be certain that the defendant understands the charge and the consequences of the
plea and that the record indicates a factual basis for the plea. Overcharge or
excessive leniency by the prosecutor must be prevented, and the judge must also
insure that the correctional disposition reached by the immediate parties is within
the range of sentencing appropriateness."9
The Standards require that the defendant have the opportunity to retain
counsel prior to his entry of a plea.2" If he is without counsel, he should at least
be given reasonable time to deliberate on his course of action.2 ' According to
both Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Standards, the
court must address the defendant personally to determine that he understands the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.2" According to the
Standards, but not the Federal Rule and some state procedures, the court must
give the defendant adequate warning of the consequences of the plea in every
case." The court's warning should include an explanation of the defendant's
waiver of constitutional rights and a realistic picture of all sentencing possibilities.
Such a warning in each case will help to avoid subsequent objections by a de-
fendant that his counsel gave him erroneous information.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, there was a general dearth of authority supporting a requirement that
the judge make a determination of the accuracy of a tendered plea of guilty. 4
Rule 11 and the Standards" require the court to make a suitable inquiry to
satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea before entering judgment on
the plea. The Standards also propose that there be a verbatim record of the
18 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY 136 (1967).
19 Id.
20 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 1.3, cited in Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409 (4th
Cir. 1968).
21 Id.
22 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 1.4. For cases citing this section, see United States
v. Howard, 407 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1969); People v. Flannigan, 267 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App.
1971); People v. McCullough, 45 Ill.2d 305, 259 N.E.2d 19 (1970); State v. Coe, 290 Minn.
537, 188 N.W.2d 421 (1971); State v. Judd, 277 Minn. 415, 152 N.W.2d 724 (1967);
Troletti v. State, 483 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Wilson v. State, 456 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1970); Ex parte Battenfield, 466 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); McBan v. Max-
well, 2 Wash. App. 27, 466 P.2d 177 (1970).
23 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 1.4(b) & (c).
24 Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules? 221 WASH. & LEE L. Rzv. 1, 10-11
(1964).
25 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 1.6. X. v. United States, 454 F.2d 255 '(2d Cir.
1971); Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1970); Moneyhun v. People, 486
P.2d 434 (Colo. 1971); Glens Falls Group Ins. Corp. v. Hoium, 200 N.W.2d 189 (Minn.
1972); State v. Coe, 290 Minn. 537, 188 N.W.2d 421 (1971); State ex rel. Kons v. Tahash,
281 Minn. 467, 161 N.W.2d 826 (1968); Edwards v. State, 51 Wis.2d 231, 186 N.W.2d 193
(1971); State v. Reppin, 35 Wis.2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).
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providency hearing.26 In some jurisdictions, no reporter is present at this
supremely critical stage, or the practice is merely to file the reporter's shorthand
notes or the clerk's minutes." A verbatim record should provide a reviewing
court with sufficient information to determine whether the defendant's rights
have been protected."
B. Plea Negotiation and Voluntariness of Plea
A frequent post-conviction attack on guilty pleas is that they have not been
voluntarily entered. The Standards require that the court determine the volun-
tariness of the plea before accepting it.2" The court must advise the defendant
personally that the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the court, if the court's inquiry reveals that the tendered plea is the result of
prior plea discussions or agreements.20
It has been said that "justice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining
and barter."'" In fact, however, charge and sentence concessions to secure pleas
of guilty are, and always have been, part and parcel of our criminal justice
system. 2 Plea negotiation involves an exchange of concessions and advantages
between the state and the accused. In Santobello, u. New York,"3 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, called disposition of criminal charges by plea
negotiation an essential component of the administration of justice. Santobello
held further that plea negotiation is not inherently coercive and, with proper
safeguards, is to be encouraged.
Traditionally, plea negotiations have remained hidden behind arraignment
procedures. Critics charge that this common invisibility provides no record, no
review, and no judicial scrutiny. 4 Other frequent objections to plea bargaining
dwell on its chilling effect on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the right to confront witnesses, as well as the right to have compulsory
26 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 1.7; see People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595; 477 P.2d
409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
27 PLEAS OF Guvry, supra note 2, at 35.
28 The record should include the requirements of PLEAS OF GUH.TY, supra note 2, at §§
1.4-1.6.
29 PLEAS OF GuaTY, supra note 2, at § 1.5. See United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940
(4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Amuso v. LaVallee, 291 F. Supp. 383 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
United States v. Miss Smart Frocks, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. West,
3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970); Moneyhun v. People, 486 P.2d 434
(Colo. 1971); State v. Coe, 290 Minn. 537, 188 N.W.2d 421 (1971); State v. Judd, 277
Minn. 415, 152 N.W.2d 724 (1967); State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971);
State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968); Belcher v. State, 42 Wis.2d 299,
166 N.W.2d 211 (1969). See also Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness &
Understanding of Guilty Pleas, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289.
30 Id.
31 Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957).
32 See D. NEWMAN supra note 1, at 76-130.
33 404 U.S. 257 (1971), in which the United States Supreme Court vacated a judgment
and sentence imposed as the result of a guilty plea that was induced by the promise of a
prosecutor which was later disavowed.
34 For criticism of the practices of plea bargaining, see generally, White, A Proposal for
Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. Rxv. 439 (1971); Note, The Uncon-
stitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HAav. L. Rxv. 1387 (1970); Note, Plea Bargaining-
justice Off the Record, 9 WASHBURN L. J. 430 '(1970); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 50 (1968).
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process for obtaining favorable witnesses, and the right to stand trial by jury.35
Moreover, the lack of uniformity in the plea bargaining process creates a certain
amount of unpredictability which many feel is unsatisfactory. In essence, the
argument against plea bargaining is that too often, when criminal cases are
compromised, the rule of law is sacrificed to the rule of convenience.
In the Standards, the American Bar Association took the position that it is
better to recognize plea bargaining, to examine the agreement and its concom-
itant facts in the open, than to allow the same bargaining in secrecy, with no
judicial review. Obviously, it is better to provide standards for proper negotia-
tions of a guilty plea than to foreclose all guidance or judicial inquiry."8 Sup-
port for the use of plea negotiation is widespread," and the Standards attempt to
serve the effective administration of justice by setting out adequate safeguards.3 '
Several matters may be the subjects of negotiation. Where the judge's power is
severely limited by high minimum or fixed maximum sentences or by the absence
of probation as an alternative, significant sentencing range is possible only
through charge reduction. Where judges have broad sentencing discretion,
agreements to seek sentence leniency are more common. The Standards approve
the use of plea agreements and the granting of charge or sentence concessions in
situations where the effective administration of justice will be furthered. 9
Ranked in their most popular use, the three most common plea agreements are
to accept a plea to a lesser offense, to dismiss other counts or charges, and to
35 U.S. CONST., amends. V, VI.
36 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 1.5.
37 For a thorough analysis of plea negotiations with reference to the ABA Standards, see
Davis, The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the Issues of Voluntariness and Accuracy, 6 VAL.
U. L. REv. 111 (1972); Hoffman, Plea Bargaining and the Role of the judge, 53 F.R.D. 499
(1972); Note, Plea Bargaining: The Case for Reform, 6 U. RIcH. L. REV. 325 (1972); Note,
Plea Bargaining-Proposed Amendments to Federal Criminal Rule 11, 56 MINN. L. REV. 718
(1972); Davis, A., Sentences for Sale: A New Look at Plea Bargaining in England and Amer-
ica, 1971 CrM. L. REV. 150; Klonoski, Mitchell, Gallagher, Plea Bargaining in Oregon: An
Exploratory Study, 50 ORE. L. REV. 114 (1971); McMenamin, Plea Bargaining in the Military,
10 AM. CRim. L. REV. 93 (1971); Comment, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of Rights and as an
Admission of Guilt, 44 TEmP. L. Q. 540 (1971); Comment, judicial Supervision Over Cali-
fornia Plea Bargaining: Regulating the Trade, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 962 (1971); Note, The ABA's
Standards on Criminal Justice and Wis. Stat. § 971.08, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 583; Note, Plea
Bargaining: A Model Court Rule, 4 U. MICH. J. LAW REFORM 487 (1971); Note, The Trial
Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness and Understanding of Guilty Pleas, 1970 WASH.
U.L.Q. 289.
38 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at §§ 3.1-3.4. These Standards have been cited in
Woodson v. Brewer, 437 F.2d 1036 (8th Cir. 1971); Baily v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th
Cir. 1968); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Raleigh v. Coiner, 302 F.Supp.
1151 (N.D.W.Va. 1969); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803 (D. Utah 1968); United States
ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d
595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970); DeLuzio v. People, 494 P.2d 589 (Colo. 1972);
Barker v. State, 259 So.2d 200 (Fla. 1972); State v. Coe, 290 Minn. 537, 188 N.W.2d 421
(1971); Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215, 183 N.W.2d 563 (1971); State v. Wolske, 280
Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146 (1968); State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968);
State v. Judd, 277 Minn. 415, 152 N.W.2d 724 (1967); State v. Starr, 186 Neb. 327, 182
N.W.2d 910 (1971); State v. Poll, 112 N.J. Super. 374, 271 A.2d 447 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Fuller, 440 Pa. 161, 269 A.2d 652 (1970); Austin v. State, 49 Wis.2d 727, 183
N.W.2d 56 (1971); State v. Draper, 41 Wis.2d 747, 165 N.W.2d 165 (1969); Galvin v. State,
40 Wis.2d 679, 162 N.W.2d 622 (1968); Cresci v. State, 36 Wis.2d 287, 152 N.W.2d 893
(1967); State v. Reppin, 35 Wis.2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).
39 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at §§ 1.8, 3.1(a). For cases citing § 3.1(a), see United
States ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Brown v.
LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1970); Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir.
1970).
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recommend agreed sentences. The Standards approve each of these three forms
of plea agreement when it is appropriate to the circumstances of the case.4'
The prosecutor has a duty to acknowledge considerations relevant to grant-
ing concessions whenever they are present. With this in mind, the Standards
require equal plea agreement opportunities for defendants occupying similar
positions.41 The facts of a particular case, of course, may lead the prosecutor to
refuse to negotiate. If the plea is not an expression of repentance, but is only an
attempt to gain leniency, the prosecutor may justifiably force a plea on the
original charge. If the guilty plea indicates remorse for criminal acts, sentence
concessions are consistent with the rehabilitation theory of criminal punishment.42
The Standards state that although the judge should not participate in plea
negotiations themselves," nevertheless, he should be made aware of any agree-
ments that have taken place. Notwithstanding the existence of a plea agreement,
the judge must independently decide whether to approve the agreement and
whether granting the concessions serves the public interest in the administration
of justice."
IV. The Role of Counsel
A. Defense
The providency hearing, at which the court accepts a tendered guilty plea,
should not be held until the accused has been fully advised both by his lawyer
and by the court. Knowledge and understanding on the part of the accused are
as constitutionally indispensable as a true factual basis for his plea of guilty."
Defense counsel cannot, of course, predict with certainty the outcome of a trial,
but the defendant is, nonetheless, entitled to a thorough professional evaluation of
his case. Defense counsel, as well as the prosecution, should conduct discovery
willingly and expeditiously and should engage in effective and timely plea dis-
cussions." The Standards prohibit plea negotiation by defense counsel, except
with the consent of the defendant.4 r When a guilty plea is predicated upon a
plea agreement of any kind, it becomes the duty of both prosecution and defense
counsel to see that the court is fully informed. Moreover, unless the court is fully
advised, defense counsel should not participate in any proceeding which might
40 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 3.1 (c).
41 Id. § 3.1(b).
42 Id. at 44.
43 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, § 4.1(a) (1972) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL JUDGE].
44 TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 43, at § 4.1 (c)(ii); PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at §
1.8 lists several considerations which are appropriate in determining this question.
45 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at §§ 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6; McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459 (1969); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
46 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE-BEFoRE
TRIAL § 1.4 '(1970) [hereinafter cited as DiscovERY].
47 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 3.2, cited with approval in Bresnahan v. People,
487 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1971).
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permit a judicial determination of guilt of an accused who elects to enter a guilty
plea while persisting in claims of innocence."
As soon as the defense lawyer has an understanding of the factual and legal
issues which support the charge against his client, he should determine whether
his client's interests would be best served by the entry of a plea of guilty. 9 The
defense lawyer has a duty to be aware of the practices and attitudes of the
prosecutor and the court relating to plea discussions.5 ° It bears repeating that
defense counsel must obtain the consent of his client before engaging in plea
discussions and must keep his client fully informed of developments in the ne-
gotiations.5 The Standards make it abundantly clear that defense counsel, in
his negotiations with the prosecution, must maintain the highest integrity. Mak-
ing false statements or trading the interest of one client for that of another is
unprofessional conduct. 2
B. Prosecution
Although it is authorized, the use of plea bargaining is not mandatory, and
the prosecutor may elect not to negotiate. Generally, however, to mitigate the
evil of prosecutorial over-charging, the prosecutor should consult with defense
counsel about disposition of charges by negotiated pleas of guilty.5" He also has
a professional duty not to engage in plea discussions directly with an accused who
is represented by counsel.5" The prosecutor has a number of avenues available
for negotiation. He may offer to accept a guilty plea to a lesser or related offense
or to drop some charges in exchange for a guilty plea to another. He may also
offer to recommend a particular sentence to the court or promise not to request
some particular one.55 It is important that the prosecutor make it dear to defense
counsel that he cannot determine the sentence which the judge will impose after
a guilty plea is entered.5 6 In federal practice, the court discourages the prosecutor
from even making sentence recommendations, because the sentencing function
belongs to the court.
When inequality in bargaining position resulted in a defendant's inability
to enforce a plea agreement, the Ninth Circuit held that the fundamental prin-
ciple of fairness implicit in due process was violated and set aside the plea.57
When a prosecutor cannot adhere to a plea agreement, he must take steps to see
48 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 5.3 [hereinafter cited as DEFENSE FUNCTION].
49 Id. § 6.1.
50 DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 48, at 247.
51 Id. §§ 6.1(b), 6.2(a).
52 Id. §§ 6.2(b) and (c).
53 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 4.1(a) [hereinafter cited as PROSECUTION FUNCTION].
54 PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 53, at § 4.1(b) and commentary. The prosecutor
must exercise considerable caution in dealing with an uncounseled defendant.
55 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 '(1971).
56 PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 53, at § 4.3.
57 Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
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that his action does not prejudice the defendant.58 Noncompliance with a plea
agreement by the prosecutor undermines the voluntariness of the defendant's
plea.5
9
V. Evaluation of a Case Through Full Discovery
Discovery prior to trial should be as full and free as possible to provide the
accused with sufficient information to enable him, with the advice of his counsel,
to enter an informed plea to the charge as well as to lesser included offenses."
The Standards offer an omnibus hearing as an appropriate pretrial procedure
to ferret out the facts. 1 The court supervises discovery and acts as a catalyst
to the process at the omnibus hearing which is only held after counsel for the
prosecution and defense have interchanged discoverable facts. A check-list,
which assumes that all conceivable issues are exposed and dealt with at an early
stage of the proceedings, is an integral part of the omnibus hearing. 2 One of
the jurisdictions which has adopted the omnibus hearing has found that one of
its greatest resultant advantages is the increase in the number of guilty pleas
which are occasioned by the omnibus hearing.8 Experience has also shown
that the omnibus hearing saves trial time and makes a speedy trial possible."'
When full discovery of the government file is permitted, the defendant and his
lawyer can realistically base their plea discussions on the contents of the file. In
fact, full discovery is a prerequisite to intelligent and early plea negotiations.
VI. Post-Conviction Review
Even though procedural safeguards inherent in the Standards help insulate
guilty pleas from subsequent attack, there are occasions when post-conviction
relief is dictated. Provisions have been made for the withdrawal of pleas of
58 PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 53, at § 4.3(c). For specific guidelines for proper
conduct in such proceedings, see also, LaBelle, Negotiated Pleas, in THE PROSECUTOR'S DESK-
Boor 239 (Healy and Manak eds. 1971).
59 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
60 DIsCOvERY, supra note 46, at §§ 1.1, 1.2; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, art. 320 (Tent. Draft 1972) [hereinafter cited as A.L.I.
CODE].
61 DISCOvERY, supra note 46, at § 5.1.
62 Id. § 5.3. The discovery and pretrial procedures proposed by these Standards were first
implemented on an experimental basis in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California in 1967 and in the Western District of Texas. See Revelle & Ashbaugh,
Criminal Pre-Trial Discovery--A Proposal, 3 GONZAGA L. REv. 48 '(1968). For a critical view
of the omnibus hearing concept utilized in San Diego Federal District Court, see R. NIMMER,
THE OMNIBUS HEARING: AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIEVING INEFFICIENCY, UNFAIRNESS AND
JUDICIAL DELAY (1971), and Nimmer, A Slightly Movable Object-A Case Study in Judicial
Reform in the Criminal Justice Process-The Omnibus Hearing, 48 DENVER L.J. 179 (1972).
63 Panel Discussion (Gillespie, Harrison, Jr., Spears), Why the Omnibus Hearing Project?
55 JUDICATURE 377 (1972).
64 Address by Judge John W. Oliver (U.S.D.C., W.D.Mo.), Judicial Conference of the
State of Michigan Annual Meeting, September 23, 1972. Judge Oliver cited a recent study
which revealed that the time period from the filing of a case to its disposition by guilty plea
averaged one month in the Western District of Missouri in contrast to a national median time
of 3.4 months. The time period for those cases disposed of by court trial, jury trial, or dis-
missal was also substantially less than the national average in this district of Missouri; at the
same time, a greater percentage of criminal convictions was obtained here than nationally.
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guilty when it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.65 Unlike Rule 32 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Standards provide that a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea should not be barred because it is made subsequent to
judgment or sentence;" the defendant must prove that one of four conditions
existed to make withdrawal necessary."
The facts of the Santobello65 case exhibit a prosecution failure to honor
a plea agreement, which is one of the four conditions for withdrawing a plea
of guilty. Again, note that the Standards mandate that post-conviction relief
not be dependent on the applicant's attacking a sentence of imprisonment then
being served.8 9
When a conviction rests upon a guilty plea, the scope of questions that sur-
vive for appellate review is restricted. A few states provide by statute0 that after
65 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 2.1. For cases discussing this section in con-junction with withdrawal of pleas, see United States v. Harvey, 463 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir.
1972); United States v. Tabory, 462 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sambro, 454
F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.
1970); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972); People v. Riebe, 40 Ill.2d 565, 241
N.E.2d 313 (1968); People v. Walston, 38 Ill.2d 39, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967); People v. Baron,
130 Ill. App.2d 588, 264 N.E.2d 423 (1970); People v. Palma, 25 Mich. App. 682, 181 N.W.2d
808 (1970); State v. Robb, 195 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1972); State v. Loyd, 291 Minn. 528, 190
N.W.2d 123 (1971); Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 162 N.W.2d 698 (1968); State v.
Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146 (1968); State v. Warren, 278 Minn. 190, 153 N.W.2d
273 (1967); Skaggs v. State, 476 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. 1972); Flood v. State, 476 S..2d 529
(Mo. 1972); Peters v. State, 50 Wis.2d 682, 184 N.W.2d 826 (1971); State v. Froelich, 49
Wis.2d 551, 182 N.W.2d 267 (1971); Belcher v. State, 42 Wis.2d 299, 166 N.W.2d 211(1969); State v. Draper, 41 Wis.2d 747, 165 N.W.2d 165 (1969); Reiff v. State, 41 Wis.2d
369, 164 N.W.2d 249 (1969); State v. Galvin, 40 Wis.2d 679, 162 N.W.2d 622 (1968):
LeFebre v. State, 40 Wis.2d 666, 162 N.W.2d 544 (1968); State v. Harrell, 40 Wis.2d 187,
161 N.W.2d 223 (1968); Cresci v. State, 36 Wis.2d 287, 152 N.W.2d 893 (1967).
66 Id.
67 PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 2, at § 2.1, Plea Withdrawal:
(a) The court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo
contendere whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves
that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
(i) A motion for withdrawal is timely if made with due diligence, considering
the nature of the allegations therein, and is not necessarily barred because made
subsequent to judgment or sentence.
(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the de-
fendant proves that:
(1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by
constitution, statute, or rule;
(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or a person authorized
to so act in his behalf;
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge
or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; or
(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the
plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose these
concessions as promised in the plea agreement.
(iii) The defendant may move for withdrawal of his plea without alleging
that he is innocent of the charge to which the plea has been entered.
(b) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court. Before
sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for
any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by
reliance upon the defendant's plea.
68 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
69 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 2.3.
70 5 CODE OF ALABAMA tit. 15, § 266 (1959); 2 Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1150 (1956);
1 ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.050 (1967).
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a conviction based upon a plea of guilty, either no appeal can be taken or only
one raising certain limited issues. The procedural safeguards which are now
required for a valid conviction on a plea of guilty reduce the need for appellate
review. The Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals provide for review of
convictions which are based upon a plea of guilty. 1
VII. Improving the Effective Administration of
Justice in Guilty Plea Proceedings
One of the main factors which contribute to public complaint about the
courts is the delay which precedes finality in a criminal case. This delay tends
to deprive criminal law and its sanctions of their effectiveness. Accordingly,
every effort should be made by the trial judge to insure that the providency
hearing does not become an avenue for post-conviction relief. The Standards
seek to insure finality without sacrificing the defendants' rights. Judge Oliver,
in reviewing the Standards, said:
If the trial judge, after appropriate omnibus hearing, accepts a plea of
guilty consistent with the ABA Standards on Pleas of Guilty he should not
be bothered about ruling against any post-conviction motion which may
later be filed. Indeed, experience establishes that the filing of a post-con-
viction motion is apparently reduced to a bare minimum if the procedures
provided generally by the ABA Standards for each step of the criminal
process are fairly followed. The quality of the administration of justice is
improved to the extent that the occasion for post-conviction review is
reduced to a minimum.7 2
In addition to the Standards, other efforts are being made to improve the
pretrial processing of a case in which a guilty plea is entered." The Ninth
Circuit has ruled that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
mandatory and must be strictly followed. 4 There must be a clear showing on
the record that the accepted plea of guilty is intelligently entered with a clear
understanding of the consequences&5 The section in A Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure relating to the court's accepting a guilty plea is based
in part on the Standards, but the requirements of the Model Code"0 differ from
the Standards in some respects. The proposed amendments to Rule 11 attempt
to eliminate unfairness to the defendant and the practice of accepting a guilty
71 AMERICAN BAR AssocrATIoN STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.3 (a) (iii).
72 Address by Judge John W. Oliver, supra note 64.
73 Some jurisdictions are experimenting with new procedures. See also A.L.I. CODE, supra
note 60, at § 350 et. soq.; JUICrAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRzLIMINARY DRAFT
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED RULES]; NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURT REPORT (Tent
Draft 1972) [hereinafter cited as COURT REPORT].
74 Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1965); Freeman v. United States, 350
F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1965).
75 Id.
76 A.L.I. CODE, supra note 60, at § 350.4. An "informed choice" rather than a volun-
tariness test is used, and the Code suggests the finding of a reasonable cause, rather than a
factual basis for the plea.
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plea predicated on a plea bargain without disclosing the agreement." The Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, although
adopting some of the ABA Standards, has an independent view on sentencing
that is related to a plea of guilty and plea negotiations.' Its proposals seek to,
minimize the likelihood that plea negotiations will result in unjust conviction or
unwarranted leniency.
As previously mentioned, the judge is free to use any appropriate pro-
cedure for determining the accuracy of the guilty plea."9 The United States
District Court for Oregon employs a "Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty,"' which,
77 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 73, at 11(e) (2), (3), (4). The court requires the dis-
closure of plea agreements in open court at the time the plea is offered, and the judge is given
latitude in sentencing discretion.
78 COURT REPORT, supra note 73, at ch. 3, The Negotiated Plea. The sentence or the
prosecutor's sentence recommendation is not to be the subject of plea negotiation, and a plea of
guilty may not be considered as a factor in sentencing. Bargaining concerning the charge is
permitted by the Commission; thus, in effect, a basic limit on sentencing is inherently im-
posed. The Commission feels that this is the only way plea negotiations and informed and
rational sentencing can be accommodated within the same system.
79 See text at note 20, supra, et seq.
80 Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Order Entering Plea:
The defendant represents to the Court:
"(1) My full true name is: ............. I am ........... years of age. I have gone
to school up to and including ..................... I request that all proceedings against me
be in my true name.
"(2) I am represented by a lawyer; his name is .....................
"(3) I received a copy of the indictment* before being called upon to plead. I
read the indictment and have discussed it with my lawyer. I fully understand every
charge made against me.
"(4) I told my lawyer all the facts and circumstances known to me about the
charges made against me in the indictment. I believe that my lawyer is fully in-
formed on all such matters.
"(5) I know that the Court must be satisfied that there is a factual basis for
a plea of 'GUILTY' before my plea can be accepted. I represent to the Court that I
did the following acts in connection with the charges made against me in Counts
(In the above space defendant must set out in detail what he did. If more space is
needed, add a separate page.)
"(6) My lawyer has counselled and advised with me on the nature of each
charge, on all lesser included charges, and on all possible defenses that I might have
in this case.
"(7) I know that I may plead 'NOT GUILTY' to any offense charged
against me. If I plead 'NOT GUILTY' the Constitution guarantees me (a) the
right to a speedy and public trial by jury, (b) the right to see and hear all wit-
nesses called to testify against me, (c) the right to use the power and process of the
Court to compel the production of any evidence, including the attendance of any
witnesses in my favor, (d) the right to have the assistance of a lawyer at all stages
of the proceedings, and (e) the right to take the witness stand at my sole option;
and, if I do not take the witness stand, no inference of guilt may be drawn from
such failure.
"(8) I know that if I plead 'GUILTY,' there will be no trial either before
a court or jury, and the Court may impose the same punishment as if I had pleaded
'NOT GUILTY,' stood trial and been convicted by a jury.
"(9) My lawyer informed me that the maximum punishment which the law
provides is ................ years imprisonment and a fine of $ ................ for the offense
charged in the indictment.
"If at this time I am at least 18 and not more than 26 years of age, I know that
the Court may sentence me under the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act or as
a Young Adult Offender for an indeterminate sentence [18 U.S.C. § 5010(b)], which
may require me to spend as long as six (6) years in a penal institution.
"(10) If I am on probation or parole in this or any other Court, I know that by
pleading guilty here my probation or parole may be revoked and I may be required
to serve time in that case, which will he consecutive, that is, in addition, to any
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sentence imposed upon me in this case.
"(11) I declare that no officer or agent of any branch of government (Federal,
State, or local) has promised or suggested that I will receive a lighter sentence, or
probation, or any other form of leniency if I plead 'GUILTY,' except as follows:
'(Here insert any promises or concessions made to the defendant or to his attorney.)
If anyone else made such a promise or suggestion, except as noted in the previous
sentence, I know that he had no authority to do it.
"I know that the sentence I will receive is solely a matter within the control of
the Judge. I hope to receive leniency, but I am prepared to accept any punishment
permitted by law which the Court sees fit to impose. However, I respectfully request
the Court to consider, in mitigation of punishment, that I have voluntarily entered
a plea of guilty.
"(12) I believe that my lawyer has done all that anyone could do to counsel
and assist me, AND I AM SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE AND HELP HE HAS
GIVEN ME.
"(13) I know that the Court will not permit anyone to plead 'GUILTY' who
maintains he is innocent and, with that in mind and because I am 'GUILTY' and
do not believe that I am innocent, I wish to plead 'GUILTY' and respectfully
request the Court to accept my plea of 'GUILTY' and to have the Clerk enter my
plea of 'GUILTY' as follows:**
"(14) My mind is clear. I am not under the influence of alcohol or drugs
and I am not under a doctor's care. The only drugs, medicines or pills that I took
within the past seven days are:
(If none, so state)
"(15) I OFFER MY PLEA OF 'GUILTY' FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY
AND OF MY OWN ACCORD AND WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING OF ALL
THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN THE INDICTMENT AND IN THIS PETI-
TION.
"(16) I waive the reading of the indictment in open court, and I request the
Court to enter my plea of 'GUILTY' as set forth in Paragraph (13) of this petition.




"The undersigned, as lawyer and counselor for the defendant
hereby certifies:
"(1) I have read and fully explained to the defendant the allegations contained
in the indictment in this case.
"(2) To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, representations
and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing petition are in all respects
accurate and true.
"(3) I explained the maximum penalty for each count to the defendant, and
since the defendant is - years of age, I informed him that he may be sentenced
under the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act or as a Young Adult Offender
and that if he is given an indeterminate sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 5010(b) he may be required to spend as much as six (6) years in a penal institu-
tion.
"(4) The plea of 'GUILTY' offered by the defendant in paragraph (13)
accords with my understanding of the facts he related to me and is consistent with
my advice to the defendant.
"(5) In my opinion the defendant's waiver of reading of the indictment in
open court as provided in Rule 10 is voluntarily and understandingly made, and I
recommend to the Court that the waiver be accepted by the Court.
"(6) In my opinion the plea of 'GUILTY' offered by the defendant in para-
graph (13) of the petition is voluntarily and understandingly made. I recommend
that the Court accept the plea of 'GUILTY.'
"Signed by me in open court in the presence of the defendant above named
and after full discussion of the contents of this certificate with the defendant, this
day of , 19-.
Order: Attorney for the 
Defendant'
"I find that the plea of guilty was made by the defendant freely and voluntarily
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when combined with proper inquiries, has greatly reduced the number of mo-
tions for post-conviction relief.8 The petition used in the Oregon court not only
insures disclosure of a plea agreement, but also preserves a written record to sup-
port the guilty plea. The judge also learns through the petition of problems
which he should inquire about before accepting the plea. Experience shows that
it takes less than ten minutes for a judge to conduct a providency hearing to
and not out of ignorance, fear, inadvertence or coercion. I further find that the
defendant has admitted the essential elements of the crime charged.
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's plea of 'GUILTY' be
accepted and entered as prayed for in the petition and as recommended in the
certificate of his lawyer.
"Done in open court this day of , 19-
United States District Judge"
* "Indictment" also includes "Information."
**"The defendant's plea of 'GUILTY' or 'NOT GUILTY' to each offense should
be entered in the blank space provided in Paragraph (13). If the indictment charges
a single offense, a defendant who wishes to plead 'GUILTY' should write in Para-
graph (13) 'GUILTY as charged in the indictment.' If more than one offense is
charged, the defendant may write in Paragraph (13) 'GUILTY as charged in
Count(s) ,' 'NOT GUILTY as charged in Count(s) .'
81 Letter from Judge Gus J. Solomon to The Honorable Alfred P. Murrah, Director,
The Federal Judicial Center, September 6, 1972:
Several Judges have written to me about the Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty.
They want to know when and how the defendants and their lawyers obtain
copies of the Petition. They also want to know our procedure in accepting a Petition
and plea, including the Judge's interrogation of the defendant.
Other Judges may be interested in my answers.
We, in Oregon have had no difficulty in getting the Petitions completed before
a defendant enters a plea of guilty.
Most defendants in criminal cases are represented by court-appointed lawyers.
Our active Criminal Justice panel has about 60 lawyers, and they serve for at least
one year. The lawyers on this panel have all handled some criminal cases, and
most of them have practiced for at least five years. At the time they are appointed,
or shortly thereafter, they know that a defendant must sign a Petition which must
be completed before he enters his plea of guilty.
Most defendants, when arrested after indictment, are brought before a Magis-
trate. The Magistrate appoints a lawyer for the defendant, informs him of his
rights, and may admit him to bail.
When the Magistrate appoints a lawyer, the United States Attorney sends the
lawyer a copy of the indictment and notifies him of the time and place of arraign-
ment. The United States Attorney also encloses a copy of the Petition to Enter
Plea of Guilty and gives advice on how to complete it. He suggests that the Petition
be filled out in the defendant's own handwriting before the hearing and that he
make sure that the defendant sets forth in section 5 of the Petition the details of
the crime committed. This statement shall contain all the essential elements of the
crime.
The procedure is almost the same when the defendant is brought before the
Magistrate without having been indicted. Here, another hearing is scheduled to
determine probable cause or whether the defendant will waive such a hearing and
whether he will also waive indictment. At that time defendant's lawyer is often
given the Petition and instructed how to complete it.
In Oregon, we permit wide discovery, and in the ordinary case the defendant's
lawyer is given the privilege of examining the government's file. At this meeting,
if counsel has not yet been given the Petition and if it appears that the defendant
may plead guilty, his lawyer will be given a Petition.
We are now changing our procedure. It will be the responsibility of the Magis-
trate, and not the United States Attorney, to fix the time and place of arraignment.
The Magistrate, and not the United States Attorney, will give the defendant or his
attorney the Petition.
In many cases the defendant will plead not guilty when he is first arraigned.
At his arraignment, he is given a trial date. If, prior to that date, defendant's
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satisfy himself that the plea has been freely and voluntarily made and to accept
the tendered plea of guilty.a
All of these suggestions and proposals should serve as a basis for legislation
which will promote the rational, fair, and efficient administration of criminal
justice. Guilt or innocence of one accused of crime should be determined at the
earliest possible time, and the adjudication should be final. The American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice are designed to work as a whole to
search out the truth in the fact-finding process; providency hearings are no ex-
ception. This article has demonstrated how the Standards also endeavor to
complement each other to delineate a procedure for disposing of a criminal case
fairly and finally by the entry of a valid plea of guilty. Such constructive pro-
posals as those of the American Law Institute, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, and the United States District Court of Oregon must also be con-
sidered as valuable supplements. Implementation of the Standards for Criminal
Justice in every state will bring accuracy and finality to pleas of guilty and will
increase the respect and efficiency of our criminal justice system.
lawyer notifies the United States Attorney that the defendant wants to change his
plea, the attorney will be told to have the Petition prepared prior to the hearing.
Wednesday is our regular plea and arraignment day, and one Judge usually
takes all the pleas and arraignments that are calendared for that day. The great
majority of the defendants who enter pleas of guilty have prepared their Petitions
before their cases are called.
Our problem is not in getting the completed Petition; it is in getting the Peti-
tion properly completed. Usually the facts of the crime are not set out with suffi-
cient specificity.
The Petition serves a useful purpose, but it is not a substitute for the require-
ments of Rule 11. It does have the advantage of letting the Judge know if there
are any problems about which the Judge should inquire before accepting. the plea.
In Oregon, when a defendant is arraigned, the United States Attorney will
announce whether it is an indicated guilty plea. If is it, the crier will bring the
completed Petition, except for the signatures, to the Judge.
The Courtroom Deputy reads the indictment, particularly if it is a short one.
After the defendant enters his plea of guilty, the Judge will interrogate the defend-
ant. If the defendant waives the reading of the indictment, the Judge will summarize
the indictment and take the plea.
When I preside, I usually start out with general questions on whether the
defendant is satisfied with his lawyer and whether he has entered the plea freely
and voluntarily without any promises or threats. I also ask him to tell me how he
committed the offense. I have before me his proposed answers to the Petition, and
when it appears necessary, I ask him questions based upon his answers. For example,
if he failed to set out in writing all the essential elements of the crime, I ask him
the necessary questions.
Ordinarily, it takes less than 10 minutes to take the plea and to satisfy myself
that the plea is freely and voluntarily made. I will then return the Petition to the
defendant for his signature and the signature of his lawyer. I usually tell the defen-
dant that he is to sign the Petition only if all of the statements in it are true and
only if he does it freely and voluntarily.
With this type of interrogation we attempt to avoid some of the problems
that arise in those cases in which a defendant may later want to be relieved of his
plea.
If the plea is a negotiated one, the answers in the Petition are particularly
useful because they will alert the Judge to the problems created by this plea and he
can ask the questions necessary to eliminate them.
We have not eliminated all 2255's, but with this Petition and with our inter-
rogation, we have greatly reduced them.
82 Id.
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